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Abstract: Common principles for resource allocation in health care can
prioritise the alleviation of small health burdens over lifesaving treatment.
I argue that there is some evidence that these principles are at odds with a
sizable share of public opinion, which holds that saving a life should take
priority over any number of cures for minor ailments. I propose two possible
explanations for this opinion, one debunking and one vindicatory. I also
outline how well-designed surveys and moral enquiry could help decide
between them. Finally, I consider how priority-setting principles could be
adjusted if the view that saving a life always trumps alleviating small burdens
were vindicated.
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Introduction
In allocating public resources for health, how do people balance individually
small beneﬁts for a multitude against individually large beneﬁts for a few?
And are their judgements well-founded? These questions garnered widespread
attention because of a well-known priority-setting exercise for Medicaid in the
US state of Oregon in 1990.1 A state commission proposed to prioritise health
interventions according to cost-effectiveness, deﬁned as cost per quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY).2 This resulted in tooth capping receiving higher pri-
ority than treatment for terminal appendicitis (Morell, 1990). To see the
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientiﬁc Method, London School of Economics, Houghton
Street, London, UK. Email: a.e.voorhoeve@lse.ac.uk
1Medicaid provides health services for the poor and is funded through a mix of state and federal
contributions.
2 One QALY is an amount of health-related well-being that is just as valuable to a person as one
year in full health. For example, a person gains one QALY by living one extra year in perfect health or
by being cured of a health problem that would have imposed on them for the next ten years an annual
health burden of 0.10. See Bognar and Hirose (2014) for an overview of the measures that have been
developed for determining the impact of health on quality of life.
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implications of this proposal, suppose that one held constant the state’s
Medicaid budget and spent it on interventions ordered from lowest to
highest cost per QALY until the budget was exhausted. It would then be pos-
sible that tooth capping would be funded, but life-saving treatment for acute
appendicitis would not be. This implication was a key contributor to public
outrage at the proposal, which led Oregon to abandon the ranking of interven-
tions by cost-effectiveness (Morell, 1990).
On a common view, a reason for this outrage was that the commission’s
ranking method failed to reﬂect people’s view that a given increment in
health-related well-being should get greater, but ﬁnite, extra weight when it
would go to someone facing a large individual disease burden than when it
would instead go to another person facing a small individual disease burden.
This analysis is backed by surveys in which the median respondent gives such
ﬁnite extra weight to the interests of those facing larger burdens (see Ubel
et al., 1996; Nord & Johansen, 2014). From this diagnosis, it follows that pri-
ority-setting would better align with the public’s views if it were based on a
severity-weighted cost-effectiveness function of the kind proposed by the
Norwegian Committee on Priority Setting in the Health Sector, on which a
QALY gained by someone facing a large health burden is three times more valu-
able (and can therefore permissibly cost three times more) than a QALY gained
by someone facing a small health burden (Ottersen et al., 2016).
Those who advocate this approach do so not merely in order to accommo-
date the public. They also believe that special concern for those facing larger
health burdens is justiﬁed, for, they hold, an improvement in the fate of the
worse off is especially valuable both because it improves total well-being and
because it reduces unfair inequality (Ottersen et al., 2016).
It is noteworthy that, on this view, the mere fact that tooth cappings were
prioritised over a life-saving operation was not what generated justiﬁed
outrage. Rather, the commission’s mistake was to apply the wrong weights
when ranking deaths from appendicitis against the loss in well-being due to
uncapped teeth. But with the purportedly right weights, tooth cappings
could still trump saving someone from acute appendicitis. For example, on
the Norwegian Committee’s proposal, if curing someone of acute appendicitis
were more than three times more costly per QALY than tooth cappings, the
latter would still be prioritised over the former.
In this article, I shall put forward an alternative analysis of people’s objec-
tions to the Oregon Commission’s recommendations. Just like the common
diagnosis, my alternative interpretation involves both an empirical and a nor-
mative claim. The empirical claim is that a sizable share of people reject the
idea that many very small burdens can jointly outweigh a few very large
ones. The normative claim is that these people may well be right. This
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alternative diagnosis has policy implications that contrast with the aforemen-
tioned Norwegian policy. For, if correct, it would lend support to a plan
announced (but not yet implemented) by the Dutch government to eliminate
public spending on the prevention and alleviation of ailments that impose
only very small health burdens, independently of their cost-effectiveness,3 in
order to focus public resources on averting more substantial burdens (CVZ,
2012a, 2012b; Voorhoeve, 2017a).
My argument proceeds as follows. In the ‘Survey evidence’ section, I con-
sider empirical data on people’s attitudes. I argue that there is evidence that
a substantial share of subjects believe that saving a young adult’s life trumps
saving a multitude from very minor harms, no matter how numerous this
multitude. In the remainder of the paper, I offer two competing explanations
of this judgement. In the ‘A debunking explanation’ section, I consider the
hypothesis that this judgement stems from people’s faulty intuitive appreci-
ation of the moral signiﬁcance of large numbers. I argue that while it has
some initial plausibility, this debunking explanation, as yet, lacks empirical
support. In the ‘A possibly vindicatory explanation’ section, I put forward
an alternative hypothesis: that those who are unwilling to prioritise alleviating
small harms over saving a life are motivated by a form of sympathetic identiﬁ-
cation with, and respect for, a person who has much more at stake than others.
In the ‘How to test our competing hypotheses’ section, I explain how these two
competing explanations are empirically distinguishable. I summarise my
ﬁndings in the ‘Conclusion’ section.
Survey evidence
In this section, I review four studies that provide what is, to my knowledge, the
best (although, as we shall see, imperfect) evidence available of people’s views
on cases in which one must balance saving some from minor health burdens
against saving others from great burdens.
The aforementioned study by Ubel et al. (1996) offered university students
(n = 42) a choice between saving the lives of ten people who would otherwise
die of appendicitis and saving a number of others from a lesser health
burden. The latter ranged from a very small burden (a cyst on a tendon in
one hand that was described as yielding a discernible bulge and infrequent,
minor pain, but no functional limitations) to a sizable burden (a benign
3 Extant policy proposals make an exception for the treatments of minor ailments that save
money in the long run, that would be administratively too burdensome to eliminate or that also
prevent larger harms (CVZ, 2012a, 2012b).
Balancing small against large burdens 127
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2017.4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 90.221.128.97, on 15 Apr 2018 at 09:26:39, subject to the Cambridge Core
meningioma – a tumour in the layers of tissue that surround the brain –
described as causing very frequent, often debilitating headaches, but not affect-
ing life expectancy). In each choice, subjects were asked which number of
people cured of the illness causing the smaller burden would “equal the
beneﬁt” brought about by saving ten lives (Ubel et al., 1996, p. 111). For
our purposes, it is of interest what share of subjects responded to these ques-
tions with ‘no number’ or ‘inﬁnity’. This information, which is represented
in Table 1, can be inferred from the data in Ubel et al. (1996) if one supposes
that every subject responding with ‘no number/inﬁnity’ to the meningioma
question also responded in this way to the cyst question.
These ﬁndings suggest that a substantial minority (35.7%) believed both: (a)
that no number of cured cysts can outweigh saving several lives; and (b) that
curing a large number of meningioma cases should take priority over saving
lives. This combination of responses is interesting because it is not explicable
in terms of familiar theories of distributive justice. In holding that curing a
number of sizable ailments (less severe than death) can take priority over
saving lives, these subjects reject the leximin principle of distributive justice
(this principle holds that one ought to ﬁrst maximally improve the least well-
off position and then proceed on to maximally improve the second least well-
off position, etc.). But they also reject well-known alternatives to leximin. A
common interpretation of utilitarianism in the context of priority setting in
health is that we ought to maximise total health-related well-being in a given
population. Obviously, on this view, curing a sufﬁciently large number of
cysts outweighs saving ten lives. As mentioned in the introduction, the same
is true of a standard version of pluralist egalitarianism, on which beneﬁts to
the badly off receive ﬁnite extra weight; it is just that, on this egalitarian
view, the number of cysts required to outweigh a life is greater than under utili-
tarianism (Ottersen et al., 2016; see also Fleurbaey & Tungodden, 2010).
Table 1. Share of responses to paired questions from Ubel et al. (1996) (n = 42)
Which number of people cured of the condition
would yield a beneﬁt equal to saving ten lives?
Meningioma case
Answer is a natural
number
Answer is ‘no
number/inﬁnity’
Cyst case Answer is a natural number 59.5% 0 (by assumption)
Answer is ‘no number/inﬁnity’ 35.7% 4.8%
Note: The bold percentage represents the share of respondents who were willing to let a multitude
of sizable harms, but no number of minor harms, outweigh ten lives.
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We should note, however, that the study has two shortcomings: ﬁrst, it
involved a small, non-representative group of subjects; and second, respon-
dents were asked what number of lesser ailments averted would generate the
same beneﬁt as averting ten deaths. But one can coherently believe that it is
impermissible to save a great many people from the harm of a cyst rather
than ten from death even when the former would generate a greater total
beneﬁt. After all, on non-consequentialist moral views, it is not always permis-
sible to do what will produce the greatest total beneﬁt. One should therefore
ask not about total beneﬁts but about permissible action: for which number,
if any, of cured cysts it would be permissible to cure the cysts rather than
save ten people’s lives. The study may therefore underestimate the share of
people who would hold that saving lives always takes priority over curing
cysts.4
Pinto-Prades and Lopez-Nicolas (1998) get somewhat closer to the correct
framing by asking what types of interventions people would prefer (although
it would have been even better had the study asked what it would be permis-
sible to choose). Subjects (Spanish students, n = 83) were told they could
either establish a neonatal care unit that would save the lives of ten new-
borns or implement a policy that would treat a “very large number (e.g.
100,000)” of others for an ailment that causes a health burden less bad than
death. The latter burden varied depending on the question; the smallest
burden was living with moderate pain and discomfort while still being able
to perform all of one’s ordinary activities.
Unfortunately, because the paper reports only the median response for each
choice, one can draw conclusions only about the majority answer in each case.
We learn that a majority chose to save the ten neonates’ lives rather than treat
the moderate pain of a “very large number” of people and that a majority was
willing to alleviate the large burdens (still short of death) of a multitude rather
than save the lives of ten neonates (Pinto-Prades & Lopez-Nicolas, 1998,
p. 290). All we can conclude, therefore, is that at least some subjects must
have displayed the combination of attitudes in question: that averting a
small number of deaths trumps alleviating a multitude of small burdens, but
that alleviating numerous quite large burdens takes priority over averting a
small number of deaths.
Moreover, even this evidence is weak because of shortcomings in the study.
First, it would have been better had there been no suggested upper bound on
4 Indeed, Damschroder et al. (2007, p. 270) report that subjects are far more likely to respond that
‘no number’ of cures for minor ailments can permissibly be prioritised over a cure for ten severe
impairments (‘choice framing’) than they are to say that curing ‘no number’ of minor ailments
yields a beneﬁt equivalent to curing ten cases of a very serious ailment (‘beneﬁt framing’).
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the size of the affected population. Second, there was a lack of clarity about the
effects of the possible interventions on lifetime health. Nomention was made of
the quality of life the neonates would have if saved from death. In addition, the
effect of the treatment for the lesser conditions was left unstated (Pinto-Prades
& Lopez-Nicolas, 1998, p. 294). Third, the use of neonates is not ideal because
some believe that, due to their as-yet underdeveloped cognitive capacities,
their claim to life is less strong than that of a teenager or young adult
(McMahan, 2002).
In contrast to the preceding studies, Damschroder et al. (2007, Study 1)
draws on a relatively large set of subjects chosen to represent the US population
(n = 827). Participants were asked to trade off saving a small number from a
greater individual burden against saving a larger number from lesser
burdens. The largest burden considered was quadriplegia and the smallest
was paralysis in one foot. In a choice between curing ten quadriplegics and
up to one million people of foot paralysis, 40% of respondents said that
they would always cure the quadriplegics. By contrast, in a choice between
curing ten people of quadriplegia and up to one million paraplegics, only
7% said that they would always cure the quadriplegics.5 As a follow-up,
respondents who chose to aid the quadriplegics rather than up to a million
people with a lesser health burden were asked whether there was a number
of people in the world such that they would save that number from the
lesser burden rather than the ten quadriplegics. A large majority (59%)
replied that there was no such number (Damschroder et al., 2007, p. 270). If
we assume this share applies uniformly across all such answers and (as
seems sensible) that no one who chose to cure ten quadriplegics rather than
a million paraplegics also chose to cure a million from foot paralysis rather
than ten quadriplegics, then we can compute the proportions listed in
Table 2. These suggest that around a ﬁfth of subjects (19.5%) endorse the
idea that even billions of cases of foot paralysis cannot permissibly take priority
over ten cases of quadriplegia, but that a multitude of cases of paraplegia can
do so. I submit that this should be treated as a lower bound on the share of
respondents who hold that no number of small harms can outweigh a very
large harm, but that some number of considerable harms can do so. For the
gap in severity (from foot paralysis to quadriplegia) is less great than it
might be; even the smaller harm (foot paralysis) is quite substantial – far
more severe, for example, than the cyst in Ubel et al. (1996).
5 These numbers are deduced from the odds ratios in Damschroder et al. (2007, Table 4) in com-
bination with the report that 17% of all answers given were “off scale refusals” (Damschroder et al.,
2007, p. 270).
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The ﬁnal study I shall review concerns income rather than health.6 The
authors asked subjects (British and Norwegian students, n = 642) the following
question (Cowell et al., 2015, p. 771):
“Suppose one poor person beneﬁts from an income increase of £G while all
the rich, no matter how many there are, suffer an income reduction of £1. If
G were large enough, would this be a good idea?”
Subjects were also presented with a follow-up question about their adherence
to the leximin principle applied to income. Overall, 33.0% of subjects both: (a)
endorsed imposing a small monetary loss on the better off, no matter how
numerous, to greatly improve the income of a single badly off person; and
(b) rejected the leximin principle.
This may be taken to indicate the support of around a third of subjects for
the view at issue. This indicator is imperfect, however, for two reasons: ﬁrst,
a loss of £1 could be regarded as yielding no appreciable loss in well-being
to a rich person. Consequently, the responses might provide an overestimate
of support for the idea that no number of small but appreciable beneﬁts to
Table 2. Share of responses to paired questions inferred from Damschroder
et al. (2007) (n = 827)
For which number of people cured of the
condition would you cure that condition
rather than ten quadriplegics?
Paraplegia case
Answer is less than ‘the
Earth’s population’
Answer is ‘no number in
the Earth’s population’
Foot
paralysis
case
Answer is less than ‘the
Earth’s population’
76.4% 0 (by assumption)
Answer is ‘no number in
the Earth’s population’
19.5% 4.1%
Note: The bold percentage represents those willing to let a multitude of cases of paraplegia, but no
number (short of the number of people in the world) of cases of foot paralysis, outweigh ten cases
of quadriplegia.
6 I shall not discuss in detail a number of further studies that, while suggestive, do not address our
central issue. Choudhry et al. (1997), Olsen (2000), Rodriguez-Miguez and Pinto-Prades (2002) and
Hukin and Tsuchiya (2005) all ﬁnd that, when the gap in the size of individual beneﬁts is very large,
people tend to ‘concentrate’ a given sum of beneﬁts among a few rather than ‘disperse’ them among
many. Schumacher et al. (2017) ﬁnd that when the gain to a recipient is large relative to the cost to
those who pay for this gain, many subjects are insensitive to the number of payers. However, their
maximum number of payers is 32. None of these studies test whether subjects endorse the idea
that a large beneﬁt to one otherwise badly off person would outweigh any number of small
beneﬁts to better-off people.
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the better off can outweigh one very large beneﬁt to a badly off person. Second,
the survey questions in Cowell et al. (2015) suggest the imposition of a loss on
some for the sake of a gain to others. Some subjects may therefore have con-
ceived of this as a question about forcible transfers from some for the sake
of another. An aversion to such transfers (e.g. on grounds that they constitute
an interference with people’s liberty) might therefore lead to an underestima-
tion of support for giving priority to large beneﬁts for a badly off person
over small beneﬁts to a multitude of better-off people.
Beyond the issues already raised, the studies reviewed all face the follow-
ing challenge. These surveys pose questions with which respondents are
unacquainted. Subjects have little opportunity for deliberation. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, inconsistent responses are common (Ubel et al., 1996; Damschroder
et al., 2007). Consequently, the answers elicited are, at best, imperfect indicators
of people’s considered commitments.
There is, in sum, a strong case for better-framed questionnaire research con-
ducted jointly by behavioural scientists and moral philosophers. Still, despite
their shortcomings, extant studies suggest that at least a substantial minority
of subjects endorse both: (a) that one ought to save one life rather than spare
any number of the better off a minor harm; and (b) that one ought to prioritise
saving a very large number of people from sizable harm over saving one life.
A debunking explanation
What might explain the judgements of this group? In their work on our atti-
tudes to genocide, Paul Slovic and Daniel Västfjäll provide a ﬁrst step
towards a hypothesis, proposing that “we may not ‘feel’ much difference,
nor [much] value the difference, between saving 87 [people from a given
harm] and saving 88” (Slovic & Västfjäll, 2013, p. 98). This remark suggests
that, intuitively, the perceived marginal moral value of the number of
averted harms of a given size is positive, but declining. However, to explain
the judgements in question, we would need to assume that the perceived
total value of averting a number of harms has an upper limit and that this
limit is a positive function of the size of the harms averted. Figure 1 illustrates
the requisite perceived value function for the cases from Ubel et al. (1996). In
the ﬁgure, the perceived value of curing a number of cysts asymptotically
approaches VC as the number tends towards inﬁnity. The perceived value of
curing a number of meningiomas approaches VM as the number tends
towards inﬁnity. If the felt value of curing ten cases of terminal appendicitis
lies in between these two limits, then we arrive at the to-be-explained intuitive
verdict that no number of cured cysts, but some number of cured meningiomas,
outweighs the value of saving ten lives.
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Now, Slovic and Västfjäll do not offer direct support for their “declining
marginal perceived signiﬁcance of numbers” hypothesis.7 They do, however,
draw attention to the common ﬁnding that we display diminished sensitivity
to changes in a perceptual stimulus (such as sound, brightness or temperature)
as the magnitude of the stimulus increases. They also suggest that our sense of
the signiﬁcance of numbers may display a similar pattern.
Interestingly, some work on our intuitive numbers sense appears to support
their conjecture. For example, we perceive a pair of numbers that differ by a
given amount as lying ‘closer together’ on an intuitive ‘mental number line’
when these numbers are larger – so that, say, 10 is perceived as further from
20 than 90 is from 100 (Longo & Lourenco, 2007). Another way of putting
this is that, at least in our untrained perception, a given increase in number
is more signiﬁcant when it takes place from a smaller base. For example,
when asked to place numbers on a line with 0 and 10 as endpoints, kindergart-
ners and members of Amazonian tribes without a formal education put 3 in the
middle, suggesting that an increase from 0 to 3 is perceived as just as signiﬁcant
as an increase from 3 to 10 (Varshney & Sun, 2013, p. 28).
There are, however, some reasons to be sceptical of the hypothesised explan-
ation of responses to our trade-off cases, for the way we intuitively map
numbers seems to depend on education. Fourth-graders, for example, place
3 at three-tenths of the way between 0 and 10 (Varshney & Sun, 2013,
Figure 1. A possible explanation of the belief that a number of meningiomas,
but no number of cysts, can permissibly outweigh ten lives
7 Slovic and Västfjäll (2013, pp. 97–98) cite data that they claim support the “diminishing mar-
ginal perceived value of averting harms” hypothesis, but in fact the cited studies support a different
hypothesis, viz. that the perceived value of saving a number of people from harm depends on the
share of the at-risk population of which they are a part, so that, say, saving 1000 people out of a popu-
lation of 2000 is perceived as more valuable than saving 1000 out of a population of 10,000.
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p. 28). The ‘mental number line’ of the educated subjects in the surveys
reviewed above may not, therefore, have exhibited the form of diminished mar-
ginal sensitivity in question. But even if it did, the literature on our numbers
sense does not appear to offer evidence in favour of the idea that the total per-
ceived value of saving a number of people from a given harm has an upper
limit, for it suggests that our untrained numbers sense is approximately loga-
rithmic, and logarithmic functions do not have an upper bound (Dehaene,
2011, pp. 64–66, 265–266). Finally, there is a need to motivate a step from
how we represent numbers on a mental line to the way we value quantities
of people saved. I conclude that while the hypothesis has some plausibility
and is therefore worth investigating, there are, as yet, important lacunae in
the case for it.
Suppose, however, that it were to explain the judgements in question. Slovic
and Västfjäll mention grounds for concluding that these judgements are unre-
liable, for, they argue, the perceived diminishing marginal importance of saving
an additional person from harm is a misperception. The equal importance of
every person’s life, they claim, implies that we should value every additional
life saved as much as the preceding one – saving 101 rather than 100 people
generates just as much additional moral value as saving three rather than
two (Slovic & Västfjäll, 2013, p. 97). If we extend their reasoning from lives
saved to other beneﬁts, then it follows that providing n people with a beneﬁt
of a given size is n times as important as providing one person with this
beneﬁt, so that (assuming that all beneﬁts have ﬁnite value) some number of
small individual beneﬁts can take priority over saving one life.
This aggregative principle has some plausibility. It is, of course, endorsed by
familiar views of distributive justice in health, including the standard form of
cost-effectiveness analysis initially applied in Oregon, as well as the form of
equity-weighted cost-effectiveness analysis now proposed in Norway.
However, given the lack of evidence for the hypothesis that the judgements
in question are based on the perception that the value of saving a number of
people from a given harm has an upper limit, we should also consider an alter-
native explanation of these judgements. I shall now do so.
A possibly vindicatory explanation
The alternative I propose is that at least some individuals employ the following
two-step procedure when making trade-offs. First, they compare how much is
at stake for each individual on either side (e.g. being cured of a cyst versus
having one’s life saved). If what is at stake for a person on one side pales in
comparison with what is at stake for a person on the other side, then the
claims of those who have much more at stake win out, irrespective of the
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numbers involved. However, if the gap between what is at stake for individuals
on either side is not too great, then the numbers on either side (as well as the
size of the individual beneﬁts at issue) count; indeed, every additional person
beneﬁted matters just as much as the preceding person.
More precisely, for the relatively straightforward type of cases we have been
considering, the view I have just sketched can be put as follows (Voorhoeve,
2014, p. 66)8:
(1) Every person whose well-being is at issue has a claim.
(2) The strength of a person’s claim increases:
(2.a) the larger the magnitude of their feasible gain in well-being; and
(2.b) the less well-off they are compared to others.9
(3) People’s claims compete just in case their claims cannot be jointly satisﬁed.
(4) A claim is relevant just in case it is sufﬁciently large when compared one-to-
one to the strongest claim with which it is in competition.
(5) The decision-maker should satisfy the greatest sum of strength-weighted,
relevant claims.
I shall refer to this view as Aggregate Relevant Claims (ARC). This view
incorporates an aggregative moral principle of the kind championed by
Slovic and Västfjäll (2013), but it constrains it by a non-aggregative principle
that compares competing claims one-to-one. What grounds the latter principle
and where does it draw the line between relevant and irrelevant claims?
I submit that the non-aggregative approach originates in a form of sympa-
thetic identiﬁcation (Voorhoeve, 2014, 2017b). While in everyday English the
term ‘sympathy’ often signiﬁes feeling along with another’s sorrow, I shall
here use the term in the sense famously articulated by Adam Smith in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, in which sympathy involves placing oneself in
another’s position with a set of standardised, or proper, attitudes (Smith,
1982). This form of sympathy is, at its heart, anti-aggregative. One can imagina-
tively place oneself in another person’s shoes, but one cannot do so for a group,
except by placing oneself in the shoes of a representative individual or by taking
up the position of each person in turn, one at a time. (This explains why research
suggests that moral reasoning that relies on sympathetic identiﬁcation alone
does not take account of numbers; see Kogut & Ritov, 2005.)
Drawing on this form of sympathy, a non-aggregative approach to distribu-
tive justice involves imaginatively taking up each person’s legitimate perspec-
tive on the situation, one person at a time. Call a person whose perspective
8While in what follows I offer my own version of this view, there are others (e.g. see Kamm,
1993, Chapters 8–10; Kamm, 2007, pp. 484–486; Temkin, 2012, Chapters 2 and 3).
9 I owe this way of determining the strength of a person’s claim to Lange (2017).
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we are taking up P. Taking up P’s legitimate perspective means taking on their
natural extra concern for themselves up to the degree that this is morally per-
missible. It also involves giving the minimally required weight to the interests of
others.10 (In line with what I take to be common-sense morality, I shall assume
that it is permissible to have a substantially greater degree of concern for
oneself than for a stranger.) From this permissible personal perspective, we
then rank the importance of the competing claims one-to-one; that is to say,
we compare the maximum value P can permissibly assign to the satisfaction
of P’s own claim to the minimum value P can permissibly assign to the satisfac-
tion of the stranger’s competing claim.
Assuming that this ranking is complete, there are two possibilities: one is
that, from P’s legitimate perspective, it is at least as important to satisfy P’s
claim as the stranger’s claim. Given the fact that P may give additional
weight to their own interests, this will occur not merely when P has more at
stake than another with whom their claims compete, but also when they
have somewhat less at stake. In this case, we might say that while comparing
claims one-to-one, we can sympathise with P pressing their claim, because P
can permissibly value the beneﬁt they might receive at least as much as the
beneﬁt that the other person might receive.
The other possibility is that so muchmore is at stake for the other person that
even from P’s permissible perspective the satisfaction of the other’s competing
claim is valued more highly. In this case, if we conﬁne ourselves to one-to-one
comparisons, we cannot sympathise with P pressing their claim, because even P
must in good conscience value the stranger’s claim over their own.
To illustrate these contrasting possibilities, consider again the cases from
Ubel et al. (1996). Suppose ﬁrst that P has a debilitating, painful meningioma
and the strongest competing claim on behalf of a stranger is to life-saving treat-
ment for appendicitis. It seems within the bounds of permissible self-concern
for P to value their own cure of the meningioma over a stranger’s life. (This
manifests itself in a number of ways. For example, it would, I submit, be per-
missible to use one’s ownmoney to cure oneself of a meningioma rather than to
purchase life-saving treatment for a stranger who would die without one’s
assistance.) By contrast, it would be indecently selﬁsh to value a cure of the
aforementioned cyst on one’s hand over a stranger’s life.
10 Following Smith (1982, especially Sections I.I.III–IV and II.II.II), I focus on a moralised form of
sympathy that involves placing oneself in another’s shoes whilst assuming morally permissible desires
and emotions. Because people’s actual sentiments may not be permissible ones, sympathy, so con-
ceived, need not involve feeling along with people’s actual sentiments. The idea of taking up a
person’s permissible personal perspective in the course of balancing people’s interests is also promin-
ent in Kamm (1993, Chapters 8–10).
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Now, of course, this process of imaginative identiﬁcation always yields
fellow-feeling with a desire of a person with the strongest claim to see their
claim satisﬁed. After all, their legitimate partiality towards themselves merely
reinforces a claim that is already stronger from an impartial point of view. It
follows that this process of identiﬁcation with each person’s perspective may
lead us to sympathise with the claims of opposing sides – as in the case of
the meningioma versus appendicitis trade-off. In such a scenario, the process
of placing oneself in each person’s position yields a vivid sense of conﬂicting
interests. However, we may also ﬁnd that we sympathise with the claims of
only one party – as in the cyst versus appendicitis trade-off. In the latter circum-
stances, the non-aggregative approach yields not discord, but concord: from
every person’s legitimate perspective, saving one from life-threatening appen-
dicitis should take priority over curing a cyst.
I submit that this distinction may explain the views of those subjects in Ubel
et al. (1996) who held that no number of cysts, but some number of meningi-
omas, could outweigh a life. In the former case, the non-aggregative approach
yields a clear, univocal verdict: save the life. By contrast, in the latter case, the
non-aggregative approach yields disagreement; it is impossible to satisfy every-
one’s legitimate claims, so some other approach is necessary for deciding
whom to help. An approach that suggests itself is to employ an aggregative
moral principle of the kind proposed in Slovic and Västfjäll (2013, p. 97).
The criterion for relevant claims that emerges from this discussion, then, is
this: a claim is relevant if and only if it is permissible for its possessor to
value the satisfaction of their claim over the satisfaction of the strongest com-
peting claim when these claims are compared one-to-one. By employing this
criterion, ARC respects a form of unanimity that arises when one takes up
each person’s point of view. But when such imaginary identiﬁcation does not
yield unanimity, ARC appeals to a form of weighted majority voting in
which the weight of each person’s vote is the strength of their claim.
ARC, then, is based on the idea that both the outlined non-aggregative
approach and the proposed aggregative approach have some validity and
that one therefore ought to attempt to mediate between them. Thomas Nagel
(1979, pp. 118 and 123) expresses this idea as follows:
“Both the separate [non-aggregative] and the conglomerate [aggregative]
methods count everyone fully and equally. The difference between them is
that the second moves beyond individual points of view to something more
comprehensive than any of them, though based on them. The ﬁrst stays
closer to the points of view of the individuals considered. … It is obvious
that [these] conceptions of moral equality … are extremely different. They
seem to be radically opposed to one another, and it is very difﬁcult to see
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how one might decide among them. My own view is that we do not have to.
A plausible social morality will show the inﬂuence of [both of] them.”
It seems to me that if people’s objection to prioritising minor over major harms
were grounded in ARC, then it would be hard to dismiss it as a product of
unreﬂective, biased judgement. Nonetheless, as limned here, ARC only deals
with a very limited range of decision problems.11 It therefore needs further
development and critical examination before one can conﬁdently endorse it
or something like it.12
How to test our competing hypotheses
Having put forward competing explanations of our target judgements, I shall
now outline two ways in which these proposed explanations are empirically
distinguishable.
First, only the hypothesis that people adhere to ARC predicts that there will
be a link between answers to the following questions (Voorhoeve, 2014,
Section VIII): (i) For a beneﬁt of size S, is there a number of people one can
provide with that beneﬁt such that one ought to aid them rather than save a
life? (ii) Does one have a personal prerogative13 to secure a beneﬁt of size S
for oneself rather than save a stranger’s life? Now, it seems to me that, in every-
day morality, the boundaries of the latter prerogative are not precisely deli-
neated; indeed, some have argued that they are irremediably imprecise
(Parﬁt, 2011, Chapter 6). Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which it is
clear that one may favour oneself; as mentioned, the meningioma versus appen-
dicitis case in Ubel et al. (1996) seems to be such a case. There are also circum-
stances in which the balance of interests is such that one may not favour one’s
dear self; the cyst versus appendicitis case seems to be an example. If the pro-
posed version of ARC is what motivates people, then these circumstances will
correspond, respectively, to cases in which they think it is permissible to priori-
tise many lesser harms over a single greater harm and to cases in which they
think this is impermissible.
11 For example, as formulated, ARC says nothing about cases involving risk or cases in which
people on ‘one side’ have claims of differing strength (e.g. when one can either save ten lives or,
instead, cure both some of their meningiomas and others of their cysts).
12 For some such work, see Temkin (2012, Chapters 2 and 3), Kelleher (2014), Voorhoeve (2014,
2017b), Gustafsson (2015), Halstead (2016), Badano (2016), Tomlin (forthcoming) and Privitera
(2017).
13 Following Kamm (2007, Chapter 1), I assume this prerogative operates within the constraints
posed by people’s rights. One is therefore to imagine that, in exercising it, one makes use only of one’s
own resources and does not violate others’ rights.
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The second empirical test is this: an adherent of ARC will hold that whether
a particular claim is relevant depends on the strongest competing claim. They
can therefore display a distinctive pattern of pairwise choices. To illustrate,
when choosing only between saving one young person’s life and curing a thou-
sand moderate ailments, ARC can hold that one must do the latter, because the
thousand’s claims are relevant and together outweigh the single person’s claim.
Moreover, when choosing only between curing a thousand moderate ailments
and curing a million minor ailments, ARC can require the latter, because the
million minor ailments are relevant in this context and they together outweigh
the thousand moderate ailments. Finally, when choosing only between saving
one person’s life and curing one million of the minor ailment, ARC can
mandate saving the life, because the claims to be cured of the minor ailments
are irrelevant in this context.14
By contrast, such a pattern of choice could not arise if people’s choices were
based on those outlined in the ‘A debunking hypothesis’ section above, for on
the latter view, the value of an intervention does not depend on the set of feas-
ible alternatives. If, for a subject, curing a thousand moderate ailments were to
take priority over saving one life and curing a million minor ailments were to
take priority over curing a thousand moderate ailments, then the subject would
have to judge that curing a million minor ailments takes priority over saving a
life, if this hypothesis were true.
Conclusion
We have examined two questions: ﬁrst, how do people believe a public body
should trade off alleviating small health burdens for many against alleviating
very large burdens for a few? Second, are their opinions well-founded?
In response to the ﬁrst question, I have argued that the available evidence is
of surprisingly low quality, in part because none of the studies reviewed poses
questions in quite the right way. Nonetheless, these studies indicate that at least
14While this pattern might appear to violate transitivity, such violation is merely apparent
(Voorhoeve, 2014, Section VI), for, as argued in Broome (1991, Chapter 5), in judging whether a
moral view violates formal principles of rational choice, two alternatives should be taken to be iden-
tical just in case, on the view, they share all pertinent features. But, according to ARC, saving a million
from aminor harmwhen the only alternative is saving a thousand frommoderate harm is importantly
different from saving a million from a minor harm when the only alternative is curing one young
person of a terminal illness, for in the former case it considers the minor harms to be relevant,
whereas in the latter case it does not. To put it differently: in the former case, on ARC, sparing the
million from a minor harm does not disrespect a person whose life is at stake, whereas in the latter
case it does (Kamm, 2007, pp. 484–487). And, once alternatives are properly identiﬁed, the outlined
pattern of choice does not violate transitivity.
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a sizable minority believe that averting a very large burden should take priority
over averting any number of minor burdens.
My answer to the second question has focused only on this group. I have put
forward two competing hypotheses. On one hypothesis, such judgements are
due to the perception that the total value of bestowing a given beneﬁt on
people approaches an upper bound as the number of people beneﬁted tends
towards inﬁnity. If true, this explanation would undermine the validity of
people’s judgements because the hypothesised perception fails to capture the
equal value of meeting each person’s health needs.
By contrast, on another hypothesis, the judgements in question are moti-
vated by sympathy with, and respect for, a person who has much more at
stake than anyone with whom their interests compete. I have also argued
that if this is indeed what motivates people, then their resistance to granting
numerous small beneﬁts priority over saving a life may well be reasonable.
While I hope to have made some progress, one conclusion is that we lack
adequate empirical knowledge about what people’s attitudes towards the rele-
vant trade-offs are and what motivates them. I have indicated a number of
ways in which collaborative work by behavioural scientists and moral philoso-
phers could improve on extant studies. Such work is clearly relevant for policy-
makers, for understanding the public’s views is key to setting priorities in a way
that engages with people’s concerns. To return to our opening policy case
study: suppose that a large share of the public reject Oregon-style rankings
because they believe that tooth cappings must never be prioritised over
curing an adult’s terminal illness. Such people will not be inclined to accept pri-
ority-setting principles such as the ones proposed in Norway that merely give
some limited extra weight to saving a life. Of course, these people’s judgements
may be based on a misperception of the importance of the number of people
that can be beneﬁted; in that case, the right response would be to attempt to
persuade them of their vulnerability to this bias. However, if their objection
is grounded in respect for the especially strong claims of a person who
would, if aided, be cured of a terminal illness, then such an argument will prob-
ably not persuade them. Indeed, I have argued such a view appears to have con-
siderable merit. If, on further examination, it proves to be a reasonable view,
then it can motivate the contrasting policy under development in The
Netherlands, which is to withdraw public funding from very minor ailments
in order to focus it on larger burdens.
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